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Abstract  
Studying very detailed micro data collected around two different VAT reforms in 
Europe, we show that tax incidence is heavily dependent on the characteristics of 
the price-setting firms. The reforms generated bimodal price-change 
distributions; nearly all independent restaurants left prices unchanged whereas a 
substantial fraction of restaurants belonging to chains chose a complete pass-
through. These differences cannot be explained by location, initial prices or other 
market-segment indicators. Instead, differences appear to arise because 
independent restaurants aim for (very) crude price ranges rather than fine-tuned 
optimized prices, whereas chains use more elaborate, coordinated pricing 
strategies. 
 
Key words: firm types, VAT incidence, price setting, restaurants 
JEL classes: H22, H32, E31  
 
1 Introduction
An increasingly active literature within public ﬁnance explores the inci-
dence of consumption taxes (Carbonnier 2007, Doyle and Samphantharak
2008, Kosonen 2015, Benzarti and Carloni 2015, and Rozema 2015). This
literature documents substantial variations in tax incidence. The typi-
cal explanation for the varying results rests on diﬀerences in market level
conditions such as elasticities of demand and supply and the degree of
competition among ﬁrms (e.g. Myles 1989, Weyl and Fabinger 2013 and
Carbonnier 2014).1 Thus, a standard assumption in most of the literature is
that ﬁrms only diﬀer in these characteristics, and given them, tax incidence
is deterministic. In this paper, we challenge this assumption and document
substantial systematic heterogeneity in the way diﬀerent businesses facing
the same market level conditions react to VAT reforms.
Empirically, we analyze price responses to VAT-reductions in the restau-
rant industry in Finland and Sweden. We use very detailed micro data on
the anatomy of price changes to study how the VAT reforms aﬀect diﬀer-
ent types of ﬁrms. In addition to the uniquely detailed evidence of tax
incidence we are able to produce, our data also allow us to present novel
evidence regarding if and how diﬀerent types of ﬁrms adjust (and coordi-
nate) their prices in response to a changing cost structure, and to what
extent their price setting behavior is in line with predictions from existing
theories on ﬁrm-level pricing strategies.2
We divide the restaurants into two categories; we refer to restaurants
that do not belong to chains or franchises as Independents and other restau-
rants as Chains. This dichotomy is based on the notion that conditions
under which prices are set in the two types of restaurants diﬀer. Pricing
decisions in independent restaurants are likely to be made by owners or
other on-site managers who are responsible for multiple decisions, includ-
ing many of a very practical nature such as staﬃng and cooking, whereas
pricing decision in chains are more likely to be made by specialists. Price
1Other aspects discussed in the literature include opportunities for tax evasion and
generic cross-industry diﬀerences, see e.g. Kopczuk et al. (2013) and Marion and Mueh-
legger (2011).
2See Klenow and Malin (2010) for a review of the literature on the anatomy and dy-
namics of price changes, and Carlsson (2014) for a recent study. For price coordination,
see e.g. Houde (2012) and Thomadsen (2005) and references therein.
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setters at independent restaurants are thus more likely to set prices under
constrained optimization.3 Restaurants belonging to chains, on the other
hand, have access to a larger infrastructure which could allow them to col-
lect information on market characteristics. Their further-reaching scope
may also allow them to coordinate price setting decisions if needed and po-
tentially attempt (but not necessarily succeed) to increase proﬁts through
elaborated price setting strategies. Although we expect the dichotomy of
ﬁrm-types to exist throughout the economy with variations both within and
across industries, we believe that the restaurant sector is very well-suited
for an analysis of ﬁrm-side heterogeneity since equally sized establishments
that are competing side-by-side can be either single-unit businesses or parts
of company-owned chains or franchises.4 We show that independent restau-
rants and chains operate in similar market segments as both groups feature
fast-food venues as well as ﬁner restaurants.
We use data on VAT-reductions in Finland during July 2010 and in
Sweden during January 2012, and rely on the price evolution in neighbor-
ing countries to control for time eﬀects. We collected data on meal-level
price changes across time for a representative sample of restaurants in the
relevant countries, and matched these to administrative records held by
the tax authorities in the two treated countries. These data allow us to dig
deep into the anatomy of the price responses. In particular, we are able to
follow the prices of the same meals over time, which allows us to examine
the full distribution of price changes for diﬀerent types of ﬁrms. We are
also able to control for the economic environment faced by the ﬁrms. Due
to the detailed nature of our data, we can provide a very precise account
of the distribution of price changes across time, as well as document po-
tential coordination of meal-level price responses within sites, chains, and
locations.
The results show strikingly clean price change patterns. The over-
3For example, they should be more likely to optimally ignore certain aspects of price
setting due to their multidimensional choice set, i.e. using a more sparse strategy for
pricing in the Gabaix (2014) sense. Independents could also follow diﬀerent objective
functions than chains with no diﬀerences in optimization constraints.
4It may be argued that the choice of industry may have geared the analysis towards
ﬁnding results that are more in line with standard theory since the restaurant industry
may be closer to perfect competition than many other industries. However, our results
are quite far from the predictions of perfect competition models.
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all pass-through is fairly low, a quarter of full pass-through in the short
run. However, this average pass-through masks considerable heterogene-
ity. The short-run impact is virtually zero for the group of independent
restaurants, whereas a substantial fraction of chain restaurants choose a
full pass-through instead. We perform a number of robustness checks to
see if this diﬀerence is due to the location, initial price (an indicator of mar-
ket segment) or type of restaurant and ﬁnd no support for these notions.5
Most notably, we show that the diﬀerence remains throughout the initial
price distribution, as well as when we focus on establishments located close
to each other within the same restaurant-dense areas, and when we zoom
in on restaurants located in malls. Using administrative tax data, we can
rule out tax evasion as the main explanation. Our analysis of VAT pay-
ments, tax credited inputs and the number of traded meals also suggest
that customer responses to price reductions were small and that changes
in, for example, meal quality are unlikely to explain our ﬁndings.
Our most striking ﬁnding is the immediate pass-through of zero for
independent businesses. This result can only be explained by standard tax
incidence models if demand is inﬁnitely elastic or supply inelastic, both
of which seem as unlikely explanations. A possible interpretation of the
results is that price setters at independent restaurants chose to ignore the
reforms because they rely on simpliﬁed pricing strategies, i.e. they aim
for cruder price targets and therefore do not re-optimize in response to
the VAT reductions.6 Additional results support this interpretation. In
particular, we analyze the types of prices the restaurants set (in the absence
of the reform) and show that independent restaurants are considerably more
likely to use prices that are rounded to integer values on their meals even
after accounting for market factors such as the price range.7 Independent
restaurants also change their prices less frequently even in absence of VAT
5The lack of responses due to the VAT cut is somewhat in line with ﬁndings in the
Kosonen (2015) study of Finnish hairdressers.
6The crude strategies could be the results of diﬀerent, perhaps better, beliefs about
the responsiveness of the customers as in the model by Gabaix (2014) although our
auxiliary analysis of price changes during an Estonian currency conversion indicates
that independents may not be universally superior in their pricing strategies.
7In this context, it is also notable that the month-to-month and year-to-year vari-
ances in taxed turnover within ﬁrms is enormous. This suggests that ﬁrms face large
idiosyncratic shocks and therefore they may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to learn about their demand
by experimenting with small changes in prices.
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reforms. It should be noted that the basic idea that some businesses may
behave in ways that diﬀer from standard theory, although largely absent in
the literature on tax incidence, is well in line with ﬁndings in other related
studies: Lazear (2004, 2005) asserted that smaller entrepreneurial ﬁrms
tend to be run by generalists who need to attend to multiple, sometimes
complicated, tasks. Bloom and Van Reenen (2010), Bloom et al. (2013) and
Drexler et al. (2014) found that the quality of managerial practices vary
widely across ﬁrms and that ﬁrms beneﬁt from management training. In
addition, it seems likely that owners or managers at independent businesses
resemble regular consumers in their behavior and these have been shown
to be aﬀected by non-standard elements such as default savings decisions
and tax salience (Chetty et al. 2009, Finkelstein 2009, and Chetty et al.
2014).
We also document that although the tax incidence pattern for chains
is more in line with standard models on average, their distributions of
pricing choices do not ﬁt the standard models perfectly either. Somewhat
simpliﬁed, our results suggest that chains either responded by fully shifting
the reduced VAT to prices or by not changing their prices at all. The high
frequency of full immediate pass-through is consistent with highly strategic
pricing behavior, for example in order to induce a response from otherwise
inattentive customers (similar to the logic of a sale),8 to elicit goodwill from
customers, or as a part of a coordinated eﬀort to prevent the governments
from resetting the VAT rates.
Furthermore, we show that although the average pass-through appears
to converge between the two types of ﬁrms over time (being statistically
insigniﬁcant after 12-15 months), the diﬀerence in pass-through distribu-
tions remain throughout. The convergence of averages is primarily achieved
through additional price increases by those restaurants (belonging to chains)
that initially responded with a full pass-through. Firms that did not ini-
tially reduce their price at all (eﬀectively ignored the reform), were instead
more likely to keep their prices constant throughout our 18 months follow-
up period.9
8See e.g. Klenow and Malin (2010) or Gabaix (2014).
9The high frequency of reverting prices among those that initially chose a full pass-
through speaks against the notion that the choice was driven by an extremely elastic
supply.
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To substantiate the hypothesis that price-setting strategies in chains are
more elaborated, and that this may explain the diﬀerences in pass-through,
we ﬁrst show that large chains coordinate their price responses between
sites, whereas price responses are not coordinated between restaurants that
do not belong to the same chain but share location. We then proceed to use
data from a currency conversion (Estonian Euro introduction). According
to standard theory, currency conversions should not aﬀect price levels, but
empirically they appear to do so (Cavallo et al. 2015) and a possible reason
is that ﬁrms choose to increase their prices in times when price changes are
less salient. We show that chain restaurants, but not independents, used
the introduction of the Euro as an opportunity to increase their prices more
than otherwise, suggesting that chains have price setting strategies that are
more elaborated than those of the independents.
Overall, we believe that our results provide clear evidence for the no-
tion that independents and chains respond very diﬀerently to changes in
consumption taxes for other reasons than market-level conditions. This
stands in stark contrast to the standard assumption that market factors
alone are important for predicting the price responses to changes in VAT
rates. Our results strongly suggest that independent businesses in the
restaurant industry rely on pricing rules that greatly reduces their price-
change frequency and their responsiveness to consumption tax reforms, in
stark contrast to pricing behavior of chains. The price setting strategies
of chains instead generates an average response which is more in line with
standard theory, but with considerable (non-standard) heterogeneity in the
price dynamics. These results could help explain the varying tax-incidence
and other price pass-through results found in previous literature (Cabral
et al. 2015, Carbonnier 2007, Doyle and Samphantharak 2008, Kosonen
2015, Benzarti and Carloni 2015, and Rozema 2015).
The structure is as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the relevant theory.
Section 3 presents institutions, data and methods. Section 4 shows results
on the short and long-run pass-through for independents and chains. Sec-
tion 5 presents supporting evidence on coordination, outputs and inputs,
round number prices and currency conversions. Section 6 concludes. All
appendices are available online.
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2 Standard tax-incidence models, and some
extensions
2.1 Standard tax-incidence models
In this short section we highlight a few features of standard tax incidence
models that are useful as a background for our empirical analysis.
A key result arising from the economic theory is that tax incidence
depends on how markets work. In the simplest, perfect competition and
a single good case, markets clear and ﬁrms are price (p) takers so that
demand (D) equals supply (S) in equilibrium. If we introduce a tax t we
get D(p) = S(p− t) and the standard tax incidence formula:
dp
dt
=
S
S + D
=
1
1 + D
S
,
where −D is the demand elasticity and S the supply elasticity. Thus,
the elasticities of demand and supply are the sole determinants of tax in-
cidence and the more inelastic side bears the burden of taxation. This
implies, e.g., that to explain a zero pass-through, one needs to assume
perfectly elastic demand or perfectly inelastic supply. To get a full pass
through, the demand elasticity instead needs to be zero, or the supply elas-
ticity inﬁnite. Starting from non-zero tax levels, or assuming ad valorem
taxes, complicates the formula slightly but does not change the main intu-
ition for the role of the elasticities. The elasticities are (typically) deﬁned
at the market and goods level and tax incidence should thus be the same
for all ﬁrms who compete on the same market.
In models of imperfect competition the role of the supply elasticity
is replaced by more advanced assumptions regarding ﬁrm behavior but
the shape of demand curve continues to play an important role. Weyl
and Fabinger (2013) compare the monopoly and perfect competition cases
and show that tax incidence in other symmetric (but more elaborated)
imperfect competition models falls between that of monopoly and perfect
competition. They show that the tax incidence for a monopoly can be
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written in a form that resembles that of perfect competition:
dp
dt
=
1
1 + D−1
S
+ 1
ms
,
where ms measures the curvature of log demand. Thus, in the monopoly
case the shape of the demand curve largely determines the tax incidence.
In other symmetric imperfect competition cases, the form of interaction
between the ﬁrms also plays an important role. However, the resulting
tax incidence response falls between the perfect competition and monopoly
models.
Weyl and Fabinger (2013) also analyze strategic interactions of ﬁrms
in their context. It is natural to assume that ﬁrms would react to the
actions of their competitors, but the possible action space is vast; a ﬁrm
could change its prices, advertise, diﬀerentiate its products and so forth.
In general, a price decrease in one ﬁrm could lead to either a price increase
or decrease in a competing ﬁrm depending on whether ﬁrms are strategical
complements or substitutes. However, these models do not yield clear
predictions for tax incidence, since the outcomes depend on the nature
of interaction between ﬁrms. In our empirical section, we provide some
evidence on how ﬁrms acting in the the same (small) geographical areas
react to other ﬁrms' price changes during the reforms.
2.2 Price stickiness
The standard analysis of tax incidence assumes that price setting is a con-
tinuous choice. However, in the broader literature on micro-level price
dynamics (see e.g. Klenow and Malin, 2010), motivated by New Keyne-
sian concerns about how to model nominal rigidities, it is observed that
the price change distribution tends to contain large spikes at zero. A stan-
dard theoretical rationale for this pattern is the assumption of ﬁxed costs
for changing prices (menu costs, as in e.g. Golosov and Lucas, 2007).10
Recently, Gabaix (2014) has also proposed that price rigidities may arise
because ﬁrms are expecting their customers to be inattentive to small price
10Recent extensions include Nakamura and Steinson (2008) who nests the model with a
standard Calvo model, and Midrigan (2011) who discusses the case where multi-product
ﬁrms have to pay a ﬁxed cost for changing any price.
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reductions. A key prediction from all of these models is that the ﬁrm-level
pass-through of a change in consumption taxes may be discontinuous, in
particular with a non-trivial fraction of ﬁrms leaving their prices ﬁxed, at
least in the short run.11
2.3 Tax evasion
Tax evasion is not included in standard tax-incidence models, but it could
potentially aﬀect the incidence of consumption taxes. In the extreme, if
all consumption taxes are evaded, changes in consumption taxes would, for
obvious reasons, not aﬀect prices. Changes in the tax rate could, under a
less extreme assumption of partial tax evasion, aﬀect tax evasion as well as
real decisions, depending on the model (see, e.g., the discussion in Slemrod
and Yitzhaki, 2002). An important factor is thus whether or not ﬁrms remit
VAT prior to consumption tax reforms, and whether these remittances
change with the reforms. As long as covered ﬁrms do remit VAT (which
they do in our case), real costs for earning income implies that changes
in the consumption tax rates will have an impact on ﬁrm-level decisions,
including their prices (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002).
3 Reforms and data
3.1 The reforms
All countries within the EU use value added taxation (VAT) for consump-
tion taxes. EU regulations stipulate the use of one standard VAT-rate and,
at most, two reduced rates. From 2009, an EU Directive allows member
states to apply one of its reduced rates to restaurant services. France was
the ﬁrst to reduce restaurant VAT, from 19.6 to 5.5 percent in 2009. Sweden
and Finland followed shortly after.
In Finland, the VAT-rate for restaurant meals was cut from the standard
rate of 22 percent to a reduced rate of 13 percent from July 1st, 2010. In
11Further behavioral explanations for nominal rigidities include discontinuous updat-
ing of information (as in Mankiw and Reis, 2002) or ﬁrm-level inattention to macroeco-
nomic shocks (as in Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2009), but (as modelled) these rigidities
do not explain zero price responses.
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Sweden the corresponding VAT-rate was reduced from 25 to 12 percent from
January 1st, 2012. In both countries meals eaten oﬀ the restaurant premises
(take away) were taxed at the reduced rate already before the reforms.
Alcohol VAT remained at the original standard rate after the reform. In
both countries the changes in VAT legislation was passed relatively close
to the reform, which makes large pre-reform anticipatory eﬀects unlikely.
We measure the impact on prices by means of the pass-through relative
to full pass-through, deﬁned as:
∆ =
pa − pb
pb
∗ 100/FP (1)
where pa (pb) is consumer price after (before) the reform. The full
pass-through (FP ) (i.e. stable producer prices) implies a drop of consumer
prices of -7.4 percent in Finland and -10.4 percent in Sweden. Notably, and
in contrast to in sales taxes in the US, consumer prices within the EU are
always displayed including VAT. Hence, ∆ is the price-change observed on
the price tags, scaled as fractions of the full pass-through.
3.2 Outline of the empirical approach
Our basic empirical approach is to compare the price evolution within
Swedish and Finnish restaurants with the evolution in neighboring coun-
tries. We use Estonia as the control for the Finnish reform, and Finland as
the control for the Swedish reform. An analysis of the average impact of the
reform thus relies on the standard diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences (DD) assump-
tion, i.e. that the behavior of the control group (neighboring countries)
properly reﬂects the (counterfactual) evolution of the treatment group in
absence of treatment. However, as our focus is on potential ﬁrm-type diﬀer-
ences in price responses, deviations from this identifying assumption only
causes problems if they are systematically related to the types of ﬁrms.
The rationale for using neighboring countries as controls mimics that of
the vast number of state level DD-studies conducted in a US setting since
Card and Krueger (1994). As with neighboring states in the US, Finland
and Sweden have very similar institutions, geographic location (both share
similar climate), share a border, have similar culture, seasonal holidays,
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vacation periods and seasonality in national food production.12 They are
also covered by the same EU regulations concerning VAT legislation.
Nevertheless, it is possible that the restaurant industries in neighboring
countries develop in diﬀerent ways over time. In our main analysis, we rely
on data we collected on our own, starting just before the reform. These
data contain a richness (and sample size) that is unavailable in standard
CPI-collections of prices, but for obvious reasons they do not cover a very
long pre-reform period.13 To check whether the key assumptions are reason-
able, we instead start by illustrating the evolution of the restaurant-meal
component of the CPI in Sweden, Finland and Norway (unfortunately we
do not have the CPI-data for Estonian restaurant meals). The evolution is
shown in Figure 1. As is evident, the CPI meal prices have trends that are
largely parallel in the diﬀerent countries with only two exceptions: Finnish
meal prices dropped in July 2010 as VAT for Finnish restaurant meals was
reduced from 22 to 13 percent and Swedish meal prices dropped in January
2012 when VAT was reduced from 25 to 12 percent.
12In both countries (as in Estonia) Christmas and New Year are celebrated in similar
manner and bank holidays are of similar length and on the same dates.
13Notably, the Swedish CPI-data only cover about 60 restaurants at each survey round.
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Figure 1: CPI-component of restaurant meal prices in Finland, Sweden and
Norway
Note: Monthly data on consumer prices for restaurant meals collected by na-
tional statistical oﬃces in Finland, Sweden and Norway. Vertical lines are for
restaurant-meal VAT cuts in Finland (July 2010) and Sweden (January 2012).
Figure 11 in Appendix B provides further evidence along the same lines,
documenting parallel pre-reform trends in sales and wage bills in Finnish
and Swedish restaurants.
3.3 Data
We collected prices directly from the restaurants using our own price collec-
tion protocol (Appendix A). We ﬁrst drew a random sample of restaurants
in Sweden, Finland and Estonia from national tax registers. These regis-
ters contain all ﬁrms liable to taxation in these countries, listed by their
primary industry. By using the national tax registers as the base for our
random sample, we linked our survey data on turnover, proﬁts, the num-
ber of employees and the total wage bill to ﬁrm-level registers at an annual
frequency.
Prices were collected by a separate team of research assistants within
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each country. Our ﬁrst choice was to collect the prices from restaurant web
pages. Most, but not all, of the restaurants had a website that included
prices for meals. If no website was found, we contacted the restaurant by
phone. This procedure allowed us to collect prices and other information
from a fairly large number of restaurants across a large geographic area
based on a random sampling frame.
For each round, we collected prices and meal information for 7 to 11
meals at each restaurant from a deﬁned protocol. Depending on the type of
restaurant, we collected elements such as starters, main courses, vegetarian
meals, pre-set lunch prices and so forth, see Appendix A for details. The
assistants chose the exact meals within each category with the intention
that these should be possible to follow over time. Since we planned to fol-
low the exact meals across time, it was not essential exactly which meals
the assistants chose within each category. Along with the prices, we also
recorded other information such as restaurant type and categorical infor-
mation about the restaurant and the surroundings, such as indicators for
being located in a mall or on a restaurant-dense street.
In the case of the Finnish reform, we collected the pre-reform data in
May to June 2010 and the short-run incidence data in July to August 2010.
The counterfactual for Finland was chosen to be Estonia (at that stage we
were, for obvious reasons, not aware that there would be a reform in Sweden
two years later). For the Swedish reform, our pre-reform survey was run in
October to November 2011 and the short-run incidence survey in February
to March 2012. In the Swedish case, we used Finland as the control country.
Although our main analysis focuses on the short-run responses, we also
repeated the survey half a year and a year and half later (for the treated
countries), which enables us to also examine medium-term price eﬀects.
A disadvantage with the longer term responses is that a larger fraction of
meals or restaurants have exited, and thus cannot be followed over time.
3.3.1 Independent restaurants and chains
A main element in our analysis for the tax incidence of the VAT reforms is
the role of price-setting ﬁrm types. Throughout, we deﬁne restaurants that
(according to our survey) are not part of a chain or franchised restaurants,
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as Independent and other restaurants as Chains. More precisely, we deﬁne
all restaurants belonging to brand names with two or more restaurants as
Chains and add restaurants belonging to very large ﬁrms (belonging to the
top quartile of total ﬁrm-level wage bills).14
We use this split of the data since we conjecture that independent
restaurants are less likely to have employees that are specialized on price
setting. Naturally, the scale of the operation allows restaurants within the
chain-category to be more specialized and to use their wider span to collect
more detailed information about the relevant market structure. In contrast,
pricing decisions within independent restaurants are more likely to be made
by owners, entrepreneurs or other managers who need to perform a wide set
of tasks (including staﬃng, and possibly, cooking) whereof pricing is just
one. This diﬀerence should make independents more exposed to some of
the concerns that have been assumed to cause price stickiness (referenced
above) such as inattentiveness or lack of proper information. Independents
may also diﬀer from chains in their views regarding how customers update
their perception of a normal price (in the Gabaix, 2014, sense) in the
wake of a VAT reduction.15 Chains may, on the other hand, be assumed to
have more elaborated dynamic objectives, such as participating in coordi-
nated price setting, and attempt to make use of their more comprehensive
networks for collecting better market information. Thus, we believe that
the dichotomy we use should be a reasonable proxy for operations that set
prices under substantially diﬀerent conditions.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics divided by the restaurant type. Al-
most two thirds of the data consist of independent restaurants. The bottom
two statistics show that the chain restaurants are larger in size. But most
other characteristics are surprisingly similar. In particular, the two types
contain very similar fractions of fast food restaurants, à la carte restau-
rants, cafes and lunch restaurants and the average meal prices are only
14We study heterogeneity within the chain-group in Appendix B.
15Of course, we cannot rule out that they also diﬀer in their objective functions,
independent restaurants may be more likely to focus on satisfying their customers in
ways that diﬀer from pure proﬁt maximizing behavior.
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marginally higher in the chains.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Chain Independent
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Share of restaurants 0.371 0 0.629 1
Price 10.134 8 7.262 8.985 7.304 7.715
Mall 0.188 0 0.391 0.089 0 0.285
Price quartile: 1 = smallest and 4 = highest
1 0.223 0 0.416 0.275 0 0.447
2 0.177 0 0.382 0.228 0 0.420
3 0.258 0 0.438 0.249 0 0.433
4 0.342 0 0.474 0.248 0 0.432
Restaurant density: 1 = least dense and 5 = densest
1 0.083 0 0.275 0.194 0 0.395
2 0.101 0 0.302 0.184 0 0.387
3 0.171 0 0.377 0.142 0 0.349
4 0.229 0 0.420 0.178 0 0.382
5 0.415 0 0.493 0.303 0 0.459
Restaurant classiﬁcation
Fast food 0.256 0 0.436 0.224 0 0.417
Ala Carte 0.544 1 0.498 0.555 1 0.497
Cafe 0.074 0 0.261 0.118 0 0.323
Lunch 0.126 0 0.332 0.103 0 0.303
N of ﬁrms 898 1,712
N of prices 4,092 6,924
Annual wage bill 22,384,642 1,794,554 75,345,249 331,516 199,333 348,199
Annual turnover 159,931,072 2,331,829 558,455,839 343,519 211,372 445,702
Note: Price is the price of meals in Euros. Mall is for restaurants in malls or shopping
dense areas. Price quartiles are based on pre-reform (restaurant averaged) meal prices
by country. Restaurant density is based on the number of restaurants by zip-code (5d in
Finland and Estonia, 3d in Sweden), where all restaurants with Mall=1 are in category
5. Lunch are for restaurants open mainly during lunch and breakfast. Annual turnover
is tax inclusive sales. Wage bill and turnover are from administrative registers, nominal
amounts converted to Euros.
Figure 2 shows the price distributions separately for independent and
chain restaurants, divided by treatment status. As is evident, the price
distributions are overlapping with very similar shapes. The comparability
across treatment status matter, since restaurants in neighboring countries
14
will be used to approximate the counterfactuals for restaurants in reform
countries. Thus, similar distributions is a positive feature, although we will
rely on diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences (DD) and therefore do not require that
the price levels are identical before the reforms. Importantly, the initial
distributions are also very similar for the two restaurant types, suggesting
that the restaurants are competing in roughly similar market segments. In
the empirical analysis, we account for remaining diﬀerences in pre-reform
prices.
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Figure 2: Pre-reform prices by treatment status and type
Note: Data from our own price collections. All prices are converted to Euros.
3.5 Methods
In the main analysis, we pool across the two reforms, but let the impact
vary between independent restaurants and chains as deﬁned above. Our
very detailed micro data allow us to follow the price development for a
given meal served in a speciﬁc restaurant over time. We are therefore
able to analyze 4 of equation (1) separately by meal. As explained above,
4= −1 indicates a full pass-through of the reform in question (-7.4 percent
15
in the Finnish reform and -11.4 percent in the Swedish reform).
When running DD-regressions for the average impact of the two groups,
we let the outcome be ∆ deﬁned in equation (1), and estimate:
∆ijr = β1D
Treat
jr +β2D
Independent
jr +β3(D
Independent
jr ∗DTreatjr )+β4(Xijr)+εijr,
(2)
using data on meal i at restaurant j and reform r, where DTreatjr is a dummy
for restaurants in the treatment group and DIndependentjr is a dummy for in-
dependent restaurants. Notably, the diﬀerence form for the outcome takes
care of all unobserved meal-speciﬁc constant factors. The coeﬃcient β1
identiﬁes the eﬀect of the VAT reform on the change in prices for chains,
β2 measures any additional price trend for independents within the control
regions and β3 reveals the process of interest, i.e. diﬀerences in respon-
siveness to the reforms between independents and chains. X contains a
vector of other covariates capturing other (market) factors besides owner-
ship structure which could explain diﬀerences in tax incidence between the
two groups. These variables are described in Table 1.
A standard concern in DD-settings is that the error term (εijr) may be
correlated within groups (see e.g. Bertrand et al. 2004). To verify that
such concerns are not distorting our inference, we apply the block bootstrap
method with clusters at the level of our identifying information (i.e. reform
times treatment-status times independent-dummy level), see Cameron et
al. (2008) for a further discussion.16
4 Main results
In this section we show our empirical results. We start by brieﬂy discussing
the overall impact of the reforms on the short-run price change distribu-
tions. We then turn to the analysis where we separate between independent
restaurants and chains. We end the section by discussing the medium term
16However, in parts of the analysis, we rely on models with very high-dimensional
ﬁxed eﬀects and this prevents us from using the block bootstrap method at this level of
aggregation. In these cases, we instead use zip-code clusters. To facilitate comparison,
we (also) report zip code clustered standard errors in the cases where the bootstrap
works.
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impact of the reforms.
4.1 Overall pass-through
We ﬁrst show estimates of the average short-run pass-through of the VAT-
reforms onto prices. This impact was already visible in the analysis of the
restaurant-meal component of CPI depicted in Figure 1 above. Using our
own micro data instead allows us to follow the same meals over time for a
large set of data points and to study the anatomy of the price changes.
Figure 3 shows the price change distributions relative to full pass-
through. The diﬀerences between the treatment and controls imply a
noticeable, but relatively modest, average short-run price eﬀect of the re-
forms.17 The large spikes at zero indicate that many prices did not change
at all. Although this spike clearly is larger for the control group (indi-
cating that the reforms had an impact on prices), it remains remarkably
pronounced for the treatment group as well, despite the large reductions
in VAT rates. The second visible spike for the treatment group is at full
pass-through (i.e. at -1), indicating that when meal prices changed, they
often changed by the full pass-through.
Table 2 quantiﬁes the average short-run price responses using the DD-
strategy of equation 2 (without the independent dummy, for now). Column
(1) is without any controls, and the estimate suggests an impact of 27
percent of full pass-through. Reassuringly, including very detailed controls
(col. 2) capturing restaurant class, meal type and initial price quartile has
only a marginal impact (increase) on the estimate of interest.18
17As our ﬁnal interest lies in the behavior of ﬁrms, we do not re-weight our main
analysis by ﬁrm sales as is done in the CPI-calculations.
18Table 6 in Appendix B shows the results separately for the two reforms.
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Figure 3: Distribution of price changes in the two reforms
Note: Meal-level price changes from 1-2 months before to 1-2 months after reforms.
Normalized; -1 is full pass-through.
Table 2: Average short-run pass-through
(1) (2)
Pass-through Pass-through
Treatment -0.268*** -0.326***
(0.035) (0.112)
[0.110] -
N 10,335 10,335
R2 0.032 0.047
Rest Class * treat x
Meal type * treat x
Price Q * treat x
Note: Dependent variable is ∆ of equation (1). Block bootstrapped standard errors with
zip code-level clusters in parentheses and eight clusters (reform times country times type)
in square brackets. The latter cannot be computed for the ﬁnal column. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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4.2 Pass-through at independent restaurants and chains
We now turn to the role of independent restaurants and chains in explaining
the overall price change patterns. Figure 4 shows the price change distri-
butions separately for chains and independents, by treatment status. As
the ﬁgure shows, the pass-through is very diﬀerent between the restaurant
types. About 60 percent of chain restaurants reduced their prices after the
reforms, whereas almost 90 percent of the independent restaurants kept
their prices constant despite the large reductions in VAT rates. Thus, the
dichotomy between independents and chains is a key predictor for where
the treated restaurants end up within the bimodal price-change distribution
shown in Figure 3.
The price change patterns of chains and independents appear similar
within the control group not covered by the reform. There the prices do
not change at all for most restaurants, which is expected given previous
research on short-run price dynamics (e.g. Klenow and Malin, 2010). Con-
trol group chains are, however, slightly more likely to change their prices
(mostly upwards, for natural reasons) than control group independents,
suggesting that independents have a less adaptive pricing strategy also in
normal times.
To quantify the short run price changes due to the reforms, and to
be able to investigate the potentially confounding role of market charac-
teristics, we estimate the DD-regressions of equation 2. Table 3 presents
the results. In column (1), we show the estimated average impact of the
reforms, while accounting for a dummy for independents, and the eﬀects
remain at around -0.27 as in Table 2 above. In column (2) we interact
the treatment dummy with the dummy for independent restaurants. Now,
the treatment variable captures the impact for chains, which is estimated
to be -0.55. Importantly, the diﬀerence to independents is large (0.45)
and statistically signiﬁcant. The implied estimate for the impact of the
reform on the independent restaurants is close to zero (-0.09) and statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant when block bootstrapping the standard errors with eight
clusters.
A reasonable hypothesis for the observed diﬀerence in meal price changes
between independents and chains is that they operate in diﬀerent types of
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Figure 4: Short-run pass-through, by treatment status and type
Note: Meal-level price changes from 1-2 months before to 1-2 months after reforms.
Normalized; -1 is full pass-through.
markets. To investigate these concerns, we use four indicators of the lo-
cal market: (i) restaurant classiﬁcation (fast food, à la carte, cafe, lunch
restaurant), (ii) meal type (mostly 7 categories, see Appendix A), (iii) the
level of the original (pre-reform) prices in quartiles, and (iv) the zip code.19
As a ﬁrst test of the market hypothesis, we re-estimate the model control-
ling for restaurant classiﬁcation and meal type dummies interacted with
treatment status in column (3). We then add (initial) price quartile dum-
mies interacted with treatment status and zip code ﬁxed eﬀects in column
(4). This means that the estimates are only based on comparisons between
restaurants (of diﬀerent types) that compete within the same price range
and location, and that are selling similar types of products. Note that
the interactions with treatment status soaks up the estimate of the overall
estimate of the pass-through. Although the point estimate of interest is
marginally reduced (from 0.45 to 0.34) when adding the very large set of
19Also controlling for indicator variable of restaurant being located in a mall does not
aﬀect any of the results of interest.
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covariates, the main thrust of the diﬀerence also remains in these very tight
speciﬁcations.20
Table 3: Short-run pass-through by type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pass-through Pass-through Pass-through Pass-through
Treatment -0.272*** -0.553*** -0.590*** -0.439***
(0.037) (0.063) (0.098) (0.051)
[0.173] [0.206] [0.203] -
Independent 0.161*** -0.089*** -0.086*** -0.066**
(0.044) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029)
[0.183] [0.066] [0.061] -
Independent 0.453*** 0.440*** 0.339***
*Treatment (0.065) (0.064) (0.046)
[0.210] [0.207] -
N 10,335 10,335 10,335 10,335
R2 0.043 0.065 0.073 0.128
Rest Class * treat x x
Meal type * treat x x
Price Q * treat x
ZIP fe x
Note: Dependent variable is ∆ of equation (1). Zip code areas are merged together
whenever there are less than 60 observations in one area. Block bootstrapped standard
errors with zip-code level clusters in parentheses and eight clusters (reform times country
times type) in square brackets. The latter cannot be computed for the ﬁnal column.***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
As an additional test, we have analyzed the responses separately by
initial price quartile. The results are displayed in online Appendix B, Figure
12. The diﬀerence between independents and chains remains remarkably
similar across the distribution.21
Overall, we interpret these results as suggesting that neither location,
restaurant category, nor price segments can explain why independent restau-
rants respond so diﬀerently from restaurants belonging to chains. In par-
20We also repeated the estimates in column (1) to (3) using alcohol price in the same
restaurant as a control. Alcohol products were not aﬀected by the VAT reduction. The
results (not reported here) are very similar to those in Table 3 indicating very robust
results.
21The main deviation is that the graph indicates that the pass-through is highest for
chains operating in the lowest price segment.
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ticular, it seems highly unlikely that similar restaurants that are located
close to each other and serving meals with similar prices before the reforms,
should face completely diﬀerent demand elasticities. Furthermore, to ex-
plain the zero pass-through for independent restaurants with conventional
models the demand needs to be perfectly elastic, which seems even more
unlikely.
4.3 Medium-run pass-through
We now turn to the longer run eﬀects using data from four separate col-
lections; the ﬁrst two are (as before) 1-2 months before the reforms and
1-2 months after the reforms, the third collection was 3-6 months after the
reforms, and the fourth 15-18 months after the reforms. We still follow
the same meal price over time, but here we only have data on the treated
countries. Obviously, some of the meals have changed, reducing the sample
size as time from the ﬁrst collection elapses. The treated part of the sample
decreases from 5,762 observations (price collection right after the reforms)
to 4,262 observations in the last price collection 15-18 months after the
reforms. On the other hand, following the same meals allows us to provide
precise measures of price changes and control for the unobserved meal size
and quality.
We have quantiﬁed the average price changes over time in regressions
based on equation 2, but using a panel of price observations for each meal.
The outcomes are log-prices at each point in time and we display estimated
coeﬃcients for time-since-reform dummies (with pre-reform prices as the
omitted category). Table 4 displays the regression results. As expected,
the short-run estimates mimic the results presented above. The immediate
reduction in prices is about -0.033 for chains and 0.028 larger than this for
independents implying a small and insigniﬁcant overall eﬀect for indepen-
dents. More importantly, the results indicate that the average diﬀerences
between chains and independents started to decline by the third collection
3-6 months after the reform. Their average price responses are converging
after 15-18 months at which time the estimated diﬀerence is considerably
smaller (0.1) and statistically insigniﬁcant.
Notably, the convergence of average prices masks considerable remain-
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Table 4: Medium-run price responses (log prices) by type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log prices Log prices Log prices Log prices
Right after -0.015** -0.033** -0.033** -0.033**
(0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
3-6 months after -0.008 -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
15-18 months after 0.026*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Right after 0.028** 0.028** 0.028**
* Independent (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
3-6 months after 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023***
* Independent (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
15-18 months after 0.010 0.010 0.010
* Independent (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
N 21,107 21,107 21,107 21,107
R2 0.040 0.044 0.048 0.068
Rest Class * treat x x
Meal type * treat x x
Price Q * treat x
ZIP fe x
Note: Data only include treated restaurants. The dependent variable is log prices. The
left-out category is the initial prices. All models include meal ﬁxed eﬀects. Zip code
areas are merged together whenever there are less than 60 observations in one area.
Block bootstrapped standard errors with country times type clusters in parenthesis. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
ing diﬀerences in price change distributions between chains and indepen-
dents. Figure 5 shows the distribution of meal price changes between the
ﬁrst collection and the consecutive three collections for the treatment group.
The upper panel of the ﬁgure is for chains and the lower panel for inde-
pendent restaurants. The ﬁrst panels from the left is the immediate price
change (the same as in Figure 4) , the second set of panels is for the total
price change until 3-6 months after the reform and the ﬁnal set of pan-
els shows corresponding numbers for 15-18 months after the reform. The
initial spike at full pass-through in the chain restaurant distribution van-
ishes almost completely already within 3-6 months from the reform. The
ﬁgure also shows that a non-trivial fraction of meal prices are at the pre-
23
reform price level a full year and a half after the reform for both types of
restaurants.
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Figure 5: Medium-run pass-through, by treatment status and type
Note: Meal-level price changes from 1-2 months before to 1-2 months after, 3-6 months
after and 15-18 months after reforms. Normalized; -1 is full pass-through.
As a ﬁnal exercise on medium-run evidence, it turns out to be illustra-
tive to separate the longer run price responses depending on whether the
initial price was changed or not, despite the obvious endogeneity. Figure
13 in Appendix B shows the results from this exercise. It turns out that
many of the prices that were at full pass-through straight after the reform
reverted back to the exact pre-reform price after 15-18 months. As a con-
trast, the prices of the meals that were stable across the reform remained
much more stable also in the following periods. Thus, the convergence of
averages (between chains and independents) is to a large extent driven by
the fact that the chains that initially reduced their prices later moved back
towards their pre-reform starting point.
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5 Mechanisms and diverging pricing strate-
gies
5.1 Restaurant density and price-change coordination
As discussed in section 3, standard theory predicts that the average price
responses should vary with the degree of market competition (Weyl and
Fabinger 2013). To tentatively investigate this issue, we calculate the area-
level density of restaurants and analyze the relationship between the den-
sity and the initial price response. We group the restaurants by density
quantiles (at zip code level) and add all restaurants located in malls to
the densest group. The results are displayed in Figure 6. As is evident,
the proxy for the degree of competition does indeed predict the degree of
pass-through, but only for the chains. The independents ignore the reform,
regardless of density.22
We have also analyzed restaurants located in speciﬁc restaurant-dense
locations in the major cities within our data. Starting from zip codes in the
cities of Helsinki, Tampere, Turku, Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö,
we divided these zip codes into smaller areas consisting of a few blocks
each. Using this area code we created a variable indicating the average
pass-through among other restaurants of the same type (independent or
chain) in the same area. We then proceed in the spirit of price-coordination
studies (see e.g. Houde 2012 and Thomadsen 2005) and analyze how corre-
lated price changes are across restaurants within the same area to see how
much cross-restaurant interactions there are in the responses to the VAT
reforms.23
Column (1) of Table 5 shows the the main DD estimate for this more
limited sample. Column (2) presents the estimated price-response coor-
dination across restaurants within the same area. Surprisingly, the point
estimate for the coordination parameter is negative, but statistically in-
22In Appendix B Figure 14 we show results for restaurants located in malls. Consistent
with the results in Figure 6, chain restaurants in malls respond more heavily than other
chains, but independent restaurants ignore the reform regardless of location.
23We also calculated the average pass-through of other restaurants of the same type
in some other randomly chosen area, to serve as a contrast. The randomly matched
contrast comes in close to zero and is insigniﬁcant in the regressions.
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Figure 6: Pass-through according to restaurant density
Note: Dependent variable is ∆ of equation (1). Density is measured by quantiles at the
zip code level. All restaurants in malls are placed in the densest category.
signiﬁcant (and, unfortunately, not very precisely estimated). The absence
of a positive estimate implies that restaurants do not seem to change their
prices as a response to the behavior of neighboring restaurants. Combin-
ing this result with the density result presented in Figure 6 suggests that
restaurants in denser areas react more, not because of the interactions with
the close neighbors but because restaurants which (for other reasons) are
more responsive to tax cuts are selected into denser areas.
Further results in Table 5 show how price responses are coordinated
within chains (column 3) and within restaurants (column 4). The evidence
suggests substantial coordination (0.7 and 0.5 respectively) in both these
dimensions. We interpret the fact that chains appear to coordinate their
price responses (at least) as much across their diﬀerent restaurants as the
typical restaurant coordinates its prices within the restaurant as strongly
supporting the notion of coordinated chain-level pricing strategies.24
24The ﬁnding of substantial coordination within chains is well in line with Conlon
and Rao (2015) and previous results from the IO literature, whereas the lack of local
coordination is not (see e.g. Houde 2012 and Thomadsen 2005).
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Table 5: Coordination in price changes across restaurants and meals
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pass-through Pass-through Pass-through Pass-through
Independent 0.566*** 0.675*** 0.171***
(0.064) (0.107) (0.032)
Others in the -0.197
same area (0.140)
Others in the 0.700***
same group (0.126)
Other prices in the 0.494***
same restaurant (0.062)
N 1,035 1,035 2,085 5,564
R2 0.149 0.157 0.136 0.191
Note: Dependent variable is ∆ of equation (1). Columns (1) and (2) are for restaurants
in restaurant-dense areas only. Column (2) adds the average price change of other
restaurants (of the same type) in the same area. Column (3) is for chains only. The
estimate is for the average price change of other restaurants in the same chain. Column
(4) includes all treated restaurants. The estimate is for the average change in other
prices within the same restaurant. Block bootstrapped standard errors with area code
level clusters (chain level in column 3). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
5.2 Heterogeneity within the chain category
In Appendix B, Table 7, we investigate which types of chains were the most
responsive to the reforms. We do this by interacting the chain and treat-
ment dummies with each other and with additional variables of interest.
We focus on the chain restaurants here, since based on our main results in
Table 3, we already know that most of price changes occur among them.
We ﬁrst show that the pass-through for chain restaurants that changed
1-3 surveyed meals across the reform was similar to the pass-though for
those that left all prices unchanged. The pass-through is somewhat smaller
(for the remaining meals) among those that changed more than 3 meals.
These results have two implications. First, models relying on ﬁxed costs
of changing anything on the menu, as Midrigan (2011), would predict that
ﬁrms who changed at least one meal could reset any price on the menu
without frictions, and that does not seem to be the case. Second, if our
data were compromised by outdated web-pages, we should see larger price
responses when page updates were conﬁrmed through meal changes. The
27
results, if anything, point in the opposite direction.
The appendix table separates the pass-through by pre-reform price
quartiles (controlled for in Table 3), showing that the lowest quartile re-
sponded the most to the VAT rate cuts. This is consistent with fast-food
and lunch chains being responsible for the highest pass-through. In column
(3) we investigate the importance of being located in a mall. These chains
have larger pass-through than other chains, conﬁrming the result in Figure
14. The results also show that franchises have a larger pass-through than
other chains. This result is interesting, since being a franchise is likely to
be correlated with the size of the network that the chain forms. Finally,
we interacted the chain and treatment variable with our restaurant density
dummies; the results conﬁrm the intuition of Figure 6.
5.3 Reported quantities and inputs: evidence from tax
registers
The evidence so far points to drastically diﬀerent pass-through for inde-
pendents and chains. Here we complement this picture by utilizing admin-
istrative data originating from tax authorities in order to investigate how
inputs and outputs change with the reform for the two types of ﬁrms.
Figure 7, shows the development of quarterly log changes of inputs
(credited against VAT) and the quarterly remitted VAT before and after
the reforms separately for chains and independents. In order to take into
account the huge variation in sales and inputs in the administrative data,
we have restricted the data by excluding observations with more than a
100 percent change in annual sales.25
For expositional reasons we normalize the series at zero four quarters
before the reforms (inputs are measured on the right-hand scale) in Fig-
ure 7. A key result from the Figure is that inputs for both types of ﬁrms
remained stable across the reforms. This indicates that neither the (re-
ported) quantities nor the qualities have responded to the reforms. As raw
food materials are a signiﬁcant part of inputs in the restaurant industry,
25In addition, data includes only the surveyed restaurants since we need the survey to
identify the chains. These data restrictions apply also to Figure 8 and Table 8 presented
in Appendix B.
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changes in meal quality are diﬃcult to achieve without adjusting the input
costs. Since the inputs develop similarly for the two types of restaurants,
quality responses appear to be an unlikely explanation for the observed
diﬀerences in price pass-through.
In contrast to the credited inputs, it is clear that the reduced VAT-rates
generated clear drops in remitted VAT for both groups. Thus, behavioral
eﬀects (increased sales or decreases in tax evasion) are, as expected, too
small to counter the negative mechanical eﬀect of the reduced rates. The
fact that the independents in our data do remit VAT, and reduce their
remittances to a similar degree as the chains, clearly speaks against the
notion that tax evasion can explain the diverging price responses.
−
20
−
10
0
10
20
In
pu
ts
 in
de
x
−
30
−
20
−
10
0
10
VA
T 
bi
ll i
nd
ex
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
Quarters from the first observation after the reform
Chain: VAT bill Independent: VAT bill
Chain: inputs Independent: inputs
Note: VAT bill (left y−axis) and inputs (right y−axis) indexed to be 0 in quarter −4.
Figure 7: Inputs and VAT remittances, by quarter relative to the reform
Note: Coeﬃcients of quarter indicators in a regression where the dependent variable is
the log 4-quarter change in VAT bills and inputs credited against VAT by restaurant
type. Based on administrative data for the surveyed ﬁrms. VAT bills and inputs are
indexed to be zero at 4 quarters before the reforms. Dotted line marks the reform.
Next we present a set of results building up towards an analysis of the
impact on (a proxy for) the number of traded meals. The idea is that the tax
inclusive revenue each month equals the number of sales multiplied by the
average ﬁrm-speciﬁc price. Since we observe the averages for both revenues
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and prices (prices from our own survey and revenue from the tax data), we
can generate a proxy for the number of traded meals by dividing revenues
by prices. The results are presented in graphical form in Figure 8, and in
table format in Appendix B, Table 8. The ﬁrst panel of ﬁgure 8 repeats
the consumer price analysis, displaying the falling prices among the chains
(using the survey data). The second panel shows the evolution of total ﬁrm-
level revenues (using administrative data for the same sample), which also
falls for the chains relative to the independents.26 The ﬁnal panel shows the
the impact on the quantities, measured as revenues deﬂated by consumer
prices. Clearly, we ﬁnd no diﬀerences between chains and independents
in terms of quantities as measured by our proxy for the number of traded
meals. Here it should be acknowledged that the underlying estimates (as
shown in Appendix B, Table 8) are imprecise since the ﬁrm-level revenue
data are extremely volatile (as shown by Figure 15 in the Appendix B) and
our sample sizes are not very large. But, taken at face value, the results
indicate that the shift towards lower relative prices among the chains does
not appear to have increased their market shares to any noticeable degree.27
This suggests that their demand elasticity is low, and that the (chain)
strategy of lowering prices was unsuccessful, at least if evaluated by the
impact on short-term sales.
26The result indicates a small decline in revenues also for both types of ﬁrms after the
reform, but it is important to note that we do not have an external control group for
this analysis.
27An inelastic change in quantities due to VAT reduction is consistent with the ﬁndings
in the analysis for hairdressers by Kosonen (2015).
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Figure 8: Changes in log consumer prices, VAT inclusive revenue and quan-
tity
Note: Coeﬃcients of half year indicators in a regression where the dependent variables
are log half year tax inclusive prices (P), tax inclusive revenues (P*Q) and a proxy for
the quantity of traded meals (P*Q/P) by restaurant type. In order to take into account
the huge variation in tax inclusive revenue (P*Q) in the administrative data, the revenue
is smoothed by controlling with the revenue of exactly one year before for each ﬁrm.
Also, due to the high variation in quarterly sales and inputs, we have restricted the data
by excluding observations with more than 100% annual changes in sales. Sample consist
of only surveyed ﬁrms. Dotted line marks the reform.
5.4 Round number pricing
The results presented so far suggest that independent ﬁrms are less likely
to respond to VAT reforms than restaurants that belong to chains or fran-
chises, even when operating within what appears to be the same market
segment. One possible explanation for this pattern is that independent
ﬁrms have less precise pricing strategies and rely on crude price targets in-
stead. This could be motivated by the complexity of ﬁguring out the exact
parameters of the demand function that these restaurants are facing (in
particular since their economic environment appears to be very volatile),
or because their objective functions are diﬀerent. A ﬁrst piece of suggestive
evidence in this direction is provided by the fact that independents appear
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to change prices less often in normal (non-reform) times as well; see the
discussion in Section 4.2 above.
To provide more evidence on the hypothesis that the independent busi-
nesses respond less to the tax reforms because they use cruder pricing rules,
we have analyzed the restaurants' use of round number prices. A large lit-
erature analyzes the lack of round number pricing as evidence of strategic
price setting, see e.g. Levy et al. (2011) and references therein. Following
this literature our hypothesis is that round number prices are a reﬂection
of a less detailed pricing strategy. We deﬁne a price as round if it takes
an integer value in Euros (in Finland) or 10 SEKs or 10 EEKs (in Swe-
den and Estonia), which are roughly comparable numbers accounting for
exchange rates (all roughly comparable to integer values of USD).28 Our
main interest is in contrasting the incidence of round prices of (e.g. a 9
Euro lunch) to the frequency of close non-round prices (i.e. 8.90 or 9.10
Euro lunches). Figure 9 show the distributions of price distances to the
closest round number separately for independent restaurants and chains.
Clearly, chain restaurants (left-hand panel) rely much less on round num-
bers than the independents (right-hand panel). Almost 50 percent of the
meal prices are round amongst the independent restaurants whereas the
corresponding number for chains is just above 20 percent.
Additionally, we have quantiﬁed the diﬀerence in the probability of
using round numbers in regressions in order to account for potential con-
founders such as the market segment of the restaurant. Table 9 in Appendix
B presents the results from regressions where the dependent variable is a
dummy for round prices. This outcome is regressed against the indepen-
dent dummy and an extensive set of controls (including the price range).
Although several of the covariates help explain the round number pricing,
the largest (and most statistically precise) estimate is for the independent
dummy.29 Independent restaurants are 29 percentage points more likely to
use round number prices than chain restaurants and the diﬀerences remain
stable and statistically signiﬁcant when more covariates are added.
28The exchange rates of 1 euro = 9.06 SEK = 15.65 EEK in December 2010.
29Restaurants with local competition have less round prices, and the same applies for
restaurants belonging to the employer confederation and those that changed some of the
content of their menu. Restaurants located in malls and fast food restaurants appear to
use more round meal prices.
32
0
10
20
30
40
50
−.5 −.4 −.3 −.2 −.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 −.5 −.4 −.3 −.2 −.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Chain Independent
Pe
rc
en
t
Distance from the round price (0)
Figure 9: Round number pricing by type
Note: Price distances to the closest round number. Round numbers are integer Euros,
or multiplicative of 10 SEKs or EEKs. Round prices are normalized to zero, bandwidth:
0.02 units.
5.5 Price increases during currency conversions
Our main results show that a large share of the (mostly chain) restaurants
that actually responded to the reforms, did so by allowing for a full pass-
through onto prices. This behavior is diﬃcult to reconcile with standard
tax incidence theories, but it could be viewed as an outcome of strategic
price setting behavior if the chains believed that they would have received
speciﬁc beneﬁts by hitting the full pass-through mark. One such reason
would be that they perceive their customers as being more responsive to
large and visible price reductions than to small adjustments; see Gabaix
(2014) for a discussion on consumer attentiveness and price setting.30
In order to ﬁnd external evidence on how strategic price changing be-
havior may diﬀer between independents and chains, we have analyzed the
price responses to the currency conversion from Estonian Krooni (EEK)
to Euro. This is an interesting experiment since currency conversions are
30Anecdotes from advertisements suggest that this may have been the case.
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expected to leave marginal production costs unchanged, and only require
a change of price tags. On the other hand, customers may ﬁnd it diﬃcult
to keep track of the exact prices during the conversion. Thus, it poten-
tially creates an opportunity for ﬁrms to strategically increase their prices
without negative customer reactions. Our conjecture is that chains should
use this opportunity more than independent restaurants if the chains, as
we believe, are (attempting to be) more strategic in their price setting
behavior.
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Figure 10: Relative price changes around Estonian currency conversion
Note: Meal price changes for Estonian restaurants before, during, and after Estonia
joined the Euro-zone.
The resulting relative price change distributions are shown in Figure 10.
Each panel shows the relative price changes across two collection moments
at diﬀerent time intervals. The results show that restaurants belonging
to chains (relative to independents) increased their prices more often just
at the time of the currency conversion than in surrounding time periods.
Regression results in Appendix B, Table 10 conﬁrm the intuition of the
Figure. The outcome in the regressions is a dummy for whether or not
the restaurant increased prices by 0.5 percent or more. The estimated
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interaction term shows that independents were 17 percent less likely to
change their prices during the currency change than chains were. The
result is robust to including additional control variables.
6 Conclusions
The previous literature on tax incidence has been heavily focused on cases
where tax incidence only depends on market level conditions such as the
elasticities of demand and supply, and the degree of competition (e.g.Weyl
and Fabinger 2013). In this paper we have instead documented that diﬀer-
ent types of ﬁrms respond very diﬀerently to consumption tax reforms.
Our results from two restaurant-VAT reductions in Sweden and Finland
show that the overall immediate pass-through pattern was bi-modal. Many
meal prices remained constant in the short-run and others were reduced
by the exact amount corresponding to a full pass-through. Restaurant
ownership structure explains a signiﬁcant part of this pattern. Almost all of
the independent restaurants kept their prices constant and thus eﬀectively
ignored the reform.
Contrary to the ﬁnding for the independents, a substantial fraction of
restaurants belonging to chains or franchises reduced their prices to a full
pass-through during the reforms. Accounting for very detailed indicators
of market segments such as price location and restaurant category does not
explain the diﬀerence between restaurant types.
Given that independent restaurants are likely to be run by entrepreneurs
or managers who need to concentrate on many other tasks than just pric-
ing strategies, one possible explanation is that these ﬁrms use much cruder
pricing strategies. Several ﬁndings support the notion of widely diﬀerent
pricing strategies: Apart from the low impact of the reform, we also ﬁnd
that independents are less likely to change their prices and rely more on
round number pricing. In contrast, chain restaurants coordinate their price
responses across diﬀerent sites and had a much higher probability to in-
crease their prices during a currency conversion.
It is notable that the pass-through pattern for restaurants belonging to
chains, on average, is more in line with expectations from standard models
in the sense that they reduced their prices in response to the reform. What
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is less expected is that, within this restaurant class, some restaurants fully
shifted the tax reduction to prices, while others did not react at all to the
reforms. This leads to an expected average pass-through, but the dichoto-
mous anatomy of these price changes does not follow directly from standard
theory. One possible explanation is that restaurants that responded by a
full pass-through did so for strategic reasons, either relative to customer re-
sponses or as part of a coordinated eﬀort to ensure that policy makers kept
the reduced VAT rates in the future. The fact that many of the restaurants
with a full short-run pass-through reverted their prices within 3 to 6 month
after the reform is consistent with this explanation.
Overall our results signify that tax incidence depends on the types of
ﬁrms populating the market. This result will be important to take into
account in future studies of tax incidence. In particular, it highlights the
usefulness of collecting ﬁrm-level data when analyzing consumption tax re-
forms. Moreover, the results suggest that policymakers should take the
ﬁrm-type distributions into account when forecasting the impact of poten-
tial consumption tax reforms.
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Appendix A: Data collection method
Our data are from a price collection method which was originally developed
to analyze the eﬀects of the VAT cut on restaurant meal prices in Finland.
The idea was to use Estonian restaurant meal prices as a comparison group
for meal prices among Finnish restaurants.
We took random samples of restaurants (based on industrial classiﬁca-
tion) from tax registers of countries in the treatment and control groups be-
fore the reforms. In particular, we took random samples from Finnish and
Estonian registers for the Finnish reform in April 2010, and from Swedish
and Finnish registers for the Swedish reform in October 2011.
We collected prices from approximately 750 restaurants in Finland and
400 in Estonia around the Finnish reform as well as 700 from both Finland
and Sweden around the Swedish reform. From each reform we collected
meal prices 1-2 months before the reforms as well as 1-2 months, 3-6 months
and 15-18 months after the reforms. In the collection, the sources of price
observations were mainly the web-pages of restaurants. If web pages with
meal prices on them were not available, we collected the prices by calling
the restaurant. In the initial collection the exact name of the meal and the
price was recorded, and then in consecutive collection rounds the price of
the same meal was collected, provided it still was available on the menu.
Restaurants are divided into four categories; à la carte, fast food, cafe-
teria (including pubs) and lunch restaurants. The price collection instruc-
tions were slightly altered depending on the category of restaurant. For
example, from an à la carte restaurant it is natural to collect main courses
and desserts, but we needed to survey a smaller set of meals from cafes.
We attempted to collect a minimum of 7 and a maximum of 11 meals and
drinks from each restaurant category, but due to not always ﬁnding enough
suitable items to collect, the minimum number per restaurant is 3 meals
or drinks. We wanted to collect at least the most common meal served by
each restaurant, and this was determined by the price collector (research
assistant). We also collected prices for other meal types such as vegetarian
dish, salad, appetizer and dessert, and soda and coﬀee prices.
Importantly, while examining the restaurant from diﬀerent sources, we
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also collected several restaurant characteristics from each restaurant; the
speciﬁc location of a restaurant, whether or not the restaurant belongs to
a chain, is located in a mall, and has a weekly changing lunch menu.
Furthermore, we linked tax register data to our price sample. These
data include the monthly amounts of VAT remittances, wage sums and
organizational forms of restaurants.
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Appendix B: Additional tables and ﬁgures
Table 6: Pass-through, separately by reform
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Finnish reform Finnish reform Swedish reform Swedish reform
Pass-through Pass-through Pass-through Pass-through
Treatment -0.256*** -0.631*** -0.172*** -0.273***
(0.032) (0.080) (0.027) (0.046)
Independent 0.337*** -0.028 -0.006 -0.081**
(0.074) (0.055) (0.026) (0.039)
Independent 0.534*** 0.167***
*Treatment (0.080) (0.056)
N 5,287 5,287 5,048 5,048
R2 0.099 0.127 0.013 0.015
Note: Dependent variable is ∆ of equation (1). Block bootstrapped standard errors
with zip code level clusters in parentheses and 1000-2000 replications: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Average pass-through with additional interaction terms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pass-thr Pass-thr Pass-thr Pass-thr Pass-thr Pass-thr
Treatment -0.099** -0.104** -0.102** -0.100** -0.112*** -0.119***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.040) (0.042) (0.040)
Chain 0.096 0.090 0.088 0.089 0.087 0.089
(0.067) (0.070) (0.067) (0.067) (0.063) (0.065)
Chain* -0.513*** -0.710*** -0.396** -0.424* -0.264 -0.416***
treat (0.197) (0.164) (0.199) (0.225) (0.188) (0.121)
Changed meal: 3 categ., ref: no meal changes
1-3 changed -0.039 -0.048
* Chain * treat (0.113) (0.121)
>3 changed 0.140** 0.048
* Chain * treat (0.070) (0.061)
Price quartile: ref. smallest
2 * Chain * treat 0.294*** 0.224***
(0.025) (0.051)
3 * Chain * treat 0.338*** 0.228**
(0.100) (0.109)
4 * Chain * treat 0.350*** 0.209***
(0.072) (0.065)
Mall -0.255*** -0.178**
* Chain * treat (0.063) (0.091)
Franchising -0.235*** -0.061**
* Chain * treat (0.072) (0.029)
Density: no. rest. quartile, ref: smallest
2 * Chain * treat -0.065 -0.057
(0.109) (0.101)
3 * Chain * treat -0.231** -0.229***
(0.099) (0.087)
4 * Chain * treat -0.533*** -0.432**
(0.140) (0.179)
N 10,335 10,335 10,335 10,335 10,335 10,335
R2 0.067 0.071 0.069 0.067 0.076 0.083
Note: Dependent variable is ∆ of equation (1). Block bootstrapped standard errors
with country, reform, and treatment level clusters. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: Results from administrative data comparing chains and indepen-
dents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
4Log Inputs 4Log VAT 4Log C. price 4Log P*Q 4Q proxy
After 0.006 -0.226*** -0.031** -0.027 -0.018
(0.030) (0.039) (0.012) (0.022) (0.024)
After* -0.008 -0.005 0.020* 0.019 0.006
Independent (0.028) (0.026) (0.011) (0.025) (0.028)
N 8,043 7,981 8,434 7,981 7,981
R2 0.000 0.178 0.012 0.008 0.007
no. restaurants 1,203 1,190 1,244 1,190 1,190
Note: Regression results for treated restaurants (similarly as is presented in the Figures
(7) and (8) ) using data one year before and after the reforms (after=1 if 1 year after
the reforms and zero otherwise). In column (1) inputs refer to quarterly inputs that
are credited against VAT and in column (2) VAT refers to the quarterly remitted VAT.
Column (3) shows the average percentage changes in consumer prices and column (4)
depicts the average percentage changes in VAT inclusive revenue. In column (5), the
quantity of traded meals is calculated by dividing the VAT inclusive revenue by the
VAT inclusive meal price (consumer price) for each restaurant within the price sample.
In order to take into account the huge variation in tax inclusive revenue (P*Q) in the
administrative data, the revenue is smoothed by controlling with the revenue of exactly
one year before for each ﬁrm. Also, due to the high variation in quarterly sales and
inputs, we have restricted the data by excluding observations with more than a 100%
change in annual sales. In addition, data includes only those restaurants from which we
have succeeded to collect prices. Block bootstrapped standard errors with municipality
level clusters and 2000 replications: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 9: Round number pricing:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Round Round Round Round
Independent 0.292*** 0.293*** 0.295** 0.266**
(0.099) (0.108) (0.122) (0.125)
Right after -0.028 -0.028 -0.031 -0.028
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
3-6 months after -0.077 -0.076 -0.080 -0.079
(0.087) (0.086) (0.087) (0.088)
15-18 months after -0.037 -0.036 -0.041 -0.039
(0.039) (0.041) (0.043) (0.045)
Rest class (ref. fast food)
Ala carte 0.058 0.002
(0.080) (0.049)
Cafe -0.040 -0.031
(0.062) (0.076)
Lunch -0.060 -0.068
(0.210) (0.157)
Price quartile: ref. smallest
2 -0.022
(0.023)
3 0.062
(0.066)
4 0.161**
(0.071)
Constant 0.248*** 0.074 0.075 0.177**
(0.079) (0.127) (0.106) (0.089)
N 19,892 19,892 19,892 19,892
R2 0.080 0.088 0.106 0.175
Price splines (10) x x x
Rest Class * treat x x
Meal type * treat x x
Price Q * treat x
ZIP fe x
Note: Regression results from the model where a dummy indicator of round number price
is the outcome. The main variable of interest is the independent variable measuring to
what extent independent restaurants use round number prices more often than chain
restaurants. Subsequent columns introduce more covariates shown in the Table. Block
bootstrapped standard errors with country, reform, and treatment level clusters. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 10: Probability of price changes before, during, and after Estonian
currency change by type: Estonian restaurants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome: 1 if 4p>0.5%, 0 otherwise
4 months before 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
3 months after 0.665*** 0.665*** 0.665*** 0.664*** 0.665***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.042)
15 months after 0.534*** 0.534*** 0.533*** 0.533*** 0.533***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052)
4 months before -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015
* Independent (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
3 months after -0.167*** -0.167*** -0.167*** -0.167*** -0.167***
* Independent (0.049) (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050)
15 months after -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.014
* Independent (0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.055)
N 7,252 7,252 7,252 7,252 7,252
R2 0.364 0.365 0.366 0.366 0.366
Meal type x x x x
Price Q x x x
Rest Class x x
Mall x
Note: Regression results for the probability of price changes after Estonian currency
change from Krooni to Euros from the beginning of 2011 by restaurant types. The
outcome is 1 if a restaurant has changed a meal price by more than 0.5%, and otherwise
zero. Results are from OLS models for diﬀerent price collections, 4 months before, 3
months after and 15 months after the currency change. Block bootstrapped standard
errors with 5-digit zip code clusters. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 11: Longer-term development of average tax inclusive turnover of
restaurants in Finland and Sweden
Note: Upper panel: Average monthly tax inclusive turnover (sales). Lower panel: Wage
sums paid to employees. All sums measured in thousands of Euros. Vertical lines in
the Figure refer to the VAT cuts for restaurants in Finland (July 2010) and in Sweden
(January 2012).
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Figure 12: Short-run pass-through by price quartiles
Note: Price quartiles are calculated based on initial prices at the restaurant level.
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Figure 13: Medium-run pass-through divided by restaurant type, initial
price change and collection rounds
Note: Distributions of meal price changes by restaurant type, initial price change (upper
panel shows the distribution for those changing prices right after the reform and lower
panel for those not changing prices) and collection rounds in the reforms relative to the
full pass-through. Price changes are normalized so that -1 refers to the full pass-through
in each reform and 0 refers to no change in prices.
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Figure 14: Short-run pass-through divided by restaurant type and restau-
rants located in malls
Note: Distributions of meal price changes by restaurant type and restaurants located in
malls in the reforms relative to the full pass-through. Price changes are normalized so
that -1 refers to the full pass-through in each reform and 0 refers to no change in prices.
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Figure 15: Changes in sales relative to own history
Note: Kernel densities of relative changes in quarterly sales for chain and independent
restaurants. We calculate a relative change in sales for each ﬁrm from two quarters before
and after the reforms. We restrict the changes to be between -100 and 100 percent. The
bandwidth is 1 percent.
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